Abstract. This paper empirically investigates the relationship between stadium attendance, hooliganism and counter-violence policy measures in Italian Serie A. In particular, this paper analyses the impact of counter-hooliganism policies adopted in 2007 on the quantity of game tickets sold. The counter-hooliganism measures, grounded on an entry card, namely a 'fidelity card', were designed to keep out hooligans from stadiums so favouring the attendance of either occasional spectators or uncommitted fans. According to our econometric investigation the expected substitution between committed fans and uncommitted fans did not take shape. In sum, the 'fidelity card' did not turn to be successful if evaluated on the average attendance perspective.
INTRODUCTION
This study analyses the relationship between hooliganism, counterviolence policies and stadium attendance in Italian Serie A. Football is the most popular sport in Italy: more than 1.1 millions of active footballers are engaged in about 570,000 official matches every week; between the age 8 and 12 years, one boy of four plays football in one of the 14,451 clubs affiliated to the Italian Football Federation (FGCI). The aggregate value of the professional football in Italy (2,660 million/€ in 2011/12) is 14% of the European aggregate production, and more than 80% is produced by Serie A.
1 Moreover, the business around football has increased exponentially since the early 1990s, when private media corporations started to broadcast football matches for the first time ever.
In spite of such success, stadium attendance shows an opposite trend. After an increase of 25% in the 1970s and by 4% in the 1980s, the average gate attendance in Serie A decreased in the following two decades by 7% and 22% respectively.
2 This negative trend turned into declining percentages of stadium occupation and gate revenues, whereas according to Deloitte (2013) , other European leagues show an opposite trend. As pointed out by Di Domizio (2007) , Caruso (2009) and Buraimo et al. (2012) several factors such as structural inadequacy of old stadiums, competing TV coverage, loss of credibility because of match-fixing and betting scandals, have contributed to this phenomenon. In addition, in Italy football is often perceived to be associated with a violent and risky environment because of hooliganism. Violent behaviour in sport contexts is not a modern phenomenon (Dunning, 1999; Nobili, 2011; Caruso and Di Domizio, 2013) . Football-related violence, in particular, does fit well with the economic definition of sport expounded by Caruso (2008 Caruso ( , 2011 , p. 456: 'a joint indivisible good, produced and consumed by different agents at a certain place and time. It can have multiple shapes. In fact, it is a combination of: (i) a market good, (ii) a relational good and (iii) an expression of threat, power and coercion'. Such definition builds on Downward and Riordan (2007) and Boulding (1973 Boulding ( , 1978 . Hence, we understand hooliganism under the basic economic principle of rational behaviour and consistently scrutinize the optimal counter-policy strategy of the government as in Poutvaara and Priks (2009) , Marie (2011) and Leeson et al. (2012) . Using information on Serie A matches and a simple model of game tickets (sold), we measured the impact of the counter-hooliganism policies and of perceived risk for public order on pay-at-the-gate attendance from season 2007/08 to season 2011/12.
The study is structured as follows: section one provides an overview on both stadium attendance and policy strategies against hooliganism in the latest two decades in Italy. Section two describes data and empirical strategy. Section three discusses the results and section four concludes.
STYLIZED FACTS ON ITALIAN STADIUM ATTENDANCE AND HOOLIGAN VIOLENCE
As noted above, if one takes into account the relevance of football in Italian society, stadium attendance appears to be relatively low. Table 1 reports the main statistical features of aggregate data.
The data for Serie A and B show a reversed U-shaped trend with a peak around the middle 80s. Although a number of criticalities arises in the econometric investigation on the long-run determinants of stadium attendance [see among others Bird (1982) , Jennett (1984) , Borland (1987) , Simmons (1996) , Downward and Dawson (2000) , and Coates and Humphreys (2007) ], Di Domizio (2007) argues that the decrease in stadium attendance coincided with hooliganism outburst and the loss of credibility of football organizations. Focusing on pay-at-thegate spectators, the author dates back the turning point in the data to season 1979/80, also known as the "black year of Italian football" because of the death of Vincenzo Paparelli (a fan hit by a rocket shoot before the derby AS Roma-SS Lazio on 28th October 1979 at the Olympic Stadium) and the match-fixing scandal involving top players, managers and owners of top teams that were finally relegated in lower divisions.
3 However, some factors prevented attendance from immediate decline in that season: (a) the return of foreign players; (b) the spillover of enthusiasm generated by the win of Italian national team at the World Cup 1982; (c) a superior competitive balance due to rivalry between AS Roma and Juventus FC. In addition, in the latest three decades, the football environment has experienced major structural changes due to exploitation of TV rights (see Baimbridge et al., 1996; Campbell and Williams, 1997; Garcia and Rodriguez, 2002; Forrest et al., 2004; Buraimo, 2008; Allan and Roy, 2008; Di Domizio, 2012) , to an increase in players' mobility (Bosman rule), to a novel scoring system and eventually a more entertaining scheduling of matches. In Italy, these changes took place over a vulnerable system widely perceived as inadequate, corrupted and lacking of effective counterviolence measures. It is therefore hardly surprising that the hooliganism phenomenon was not effectively countered in spite of the dramatic events that shocked the public opinion in the season 1979/ 80. As a matter of fact, the first special law appeared only in 1989, in the aftermath of a number of violent episodes. The Law 13th December 1989, however, proved to be ineffective in limiting the violent attitude of hooligans. Unfortunately, such assessment is to be applied also for subsequent law interventions in 1993 (Law 205), 2003 (Decree 24th February n.28 and Law 88), 2005 (Law 17th August n.168 and Law 17th October n.210) (Garraffa, 2010a,b) . In fact, the phenomenon did not decrease: in the period 2003-07, we note that 1,114 matches played on Italian fields were characterized by violent episodes, 5,338 people were injured (3,883 policemen and 1,557 civilians), 1,726 were arrested and 6,101 denounced to public order authorities (Masucci and Gallo, 2011) . A turning point occurred in February 2007, when the death of the policeman Filippo Raciti at the Sicilian derby between Calcio Catania and US Palermo forced the Italian government to introduce stricter counter-policy measures. The following Decree n.8 of 8th February 2007 focused on: (i) 'behind closed doors' matches in specific cases; (ii) prohibition of cumulative tickets selling for away fans; (iii) sharper punishment for hooligans; (iv) penalties for clubs supporting fans organizations involved in violent episodes. A key role was also assigned to the National Observatory of Sports Events (hereafter Observatory), created in 1999 by the State Police after the death of four supporters of US Salernitana in a train fire. The Observatory collects information about violent events, computes a risk score for matches and suggests restrictions to attendance especially for away fans. Since 2008 (Decree 15th August) the Observatory activity was enhanced with the Committee for the Analysis and Safety of Sports Events (hereafter Committee), which sets the intensity of restrictions according to the risky code reported by the Observatory. The restrictions are classified by deterrence strength and listed as: (a) admittance prohibited; (b) admittance restricted to seasonal ticket holders; (c) closing of away fans stadium area; (d) tickets selling limited to the home team area. In addition, to promote the sports culture values of non-violence and peaceful coexistence, the Law 41 (art. 8, comma 4) also encouraged teams to cooperate with fans groups; this opportunity was enshrined in the fidelity fan card project, approved in May 2008. The fidelity card is a badge that recognizes the identity and criminal records of committed fans and members of organized groups. Since 2010/11, it is compulsory for seasonal ticket holders and away fans. It soon met a strong opposition because of the profiling mechanism and for its related business scheme (Garraffa, 2011) . In fact, the supreme court of administrative affairs, namely, the State Council, outlawed the compulsory association between the fidelity card and the revolving card released by a bank. 4 In brief, both government and sport authorities have fairly achieved the goal of reducing the risk associated with football matches and preserving public order. The counterviolence measures reached the following results: (i) a reduction of matches characterized by the number of injured from 101 in 2006/07 to 60 in 2011/12; (ii) a reduction of the number of injured among civilian (from 134 to 83) and policemen (from 316 to 37), the number of people arrested (from 246 to 75) and charged with violent behaviour (from 848 to 504). 5 In what follows we analyse and discuss the effects of such counterviolence measures on stadium attendance in Italian Serie A.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
This section empirically investigates the stadium attendance for the period 2007-2012 in Italian Serie A. In particular, we highlight the effect of counterviolence 4. See Council State sentence, Section VI, n.5364 of 7th December 2011, available at www.altalex. com (June, 2012). 5. Source: www.osservatoriosport.interno.it, in the section 'dati statistici' (October, 2013) . measures adopted by Law 41, with a special attention to the fidelity fan card project. The econometric investigation is performed at a single match level, using a panel time-series data of about 50,000 observations on Serie A matches. The panel includes 289 cross-section units over a time range between two and five years. Although in the period under investigation the total number of matches played in Serie A sum to 1,990, the sample includes only 1,227 matches because of missing matches due to relegation in Serie B, 6 the lack of data for some teams, and data inconsistency.
7
In the regression equation, the dependent variable is Game Tickets sold, that is, the number of uncommitted and occasional spectators. We choose Game Tickets rather than total attendance for two reasons: (1) to highlight the effect of independent variables on casual fans; (2) because the government strategy against violence influenced the number of seasonal tickets binding the fidelity fan card subscription to seasonal ticket holders. This prompt us to include Seasonal Tickets among the explanatory variables, so as to identify the potential increase in the sale of game tickets brought about by a reduction in the seasonal tickets sold due to the ostracism of the organized fans because of the fidelity fan card combination.
8
In what follows we draw from the established literature on attendance [see among others Downward and Dawson (2000) , Dobson and Goddard (2001) ]. We arranged the independent variables into five groups. The first includes economic variables proxing the state of the economy in the home team area, tickets price and travelling cost for the away fans. We employed the annual average employment rate in the home team catchment area (Home Team Employment Rate -at the province level) as a proxy for the general state of the economy [in analysis on sport it has been proposed by Borland (1987) , Borland and Lye (1992) , Dobson and Goddard (1996) , Falter and P erignon (2000) ]. We used the distance in kilometres (Distance in Kilometres) between home and away team towns, provided by the Michelin Itineraries Guide, as a proxy for travelling costs. 9 For matches played by teams placed in the same town we normalized the distance to 1 for convenience. In the case of multiple indications for the shortest route between cities we chose the less expensive one. Finally, we computed the Ticket Price Index as a ratio between the Football Match Price Index and Consumer Price Index. The first summarizes the monthly tickets price index at the aggregate level, the second the usual inflation index for all goods and services. They are both drawn from Italian national Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). The choice of a proxy for tickets price is a critical issue in the econometric investigation on football 6. Teams are: Atalanta BC, Bologna FC*, Cagliari Calcio, Calcio Catania, AC Chievo-Verona*, ACF Fiorentina, Genoa FC, Internazionale FCM, Juventus FC, SS Lazio, Milan AC, SSC Napoli, US Palermo, Parma FC*, AS Roma, UC Sampdoria*, AC Siena* and Udinese Calcio; *indicates teams relegated in Serie B in one season. 7. Missing data refer to the home matches played by Cagliari Calcio: the club does not provide official data on single match attendance. Other data not included in the panel refer to matches played without crowd or with sole seasonal ticket holders, or to data clearly off beam, as total attendance reported was less than seasonal tickets sold. 8. Data on single match attendance are available at www.stadiapostcards.com in section 'archivi' (September, 2012). 9. Data on distance are available at www.viamichelin.it (September, 2013). attendance (see Noll, 2013; Simmons, 2006; Feehan, 2006; Sandy et al., 2004) . Bird (1982) , Dobson and Goddard (1992) , , Garcia and Rodriguez (2002) , Villa et al. (2011) , for example, used the minimum adult admittance price at single club level for the British and Spanish contexts. Avgerinou and Giakoumatos (2009) employed gross tickets revenue of football club divided by the number of tickets sold, deflated by the Consumer Price Index for Greek professional football. Our choice, on the other hand, was determined by the absence of data collection on tickets price by clubs or league. Thus, we turned to aggregate data provided by ISTAT in its monthly report on inflation to derive a Tickets Price Index.
The second group includes two demographic variables: the Home Team Population and the Away Team Population. As suggested by Cairns (1987) and Buraimo and Simmons (2006) , these variables address the market size effect on attendance and were drawn from data on municipality residents at the middle of the season under investigation (31th December).
10 Please note that town population of AC Chievo-Verona, Genoa FC, Internazionale FCM, Juventus FC, SS Lazio, Milan AC, AS Roma and UC Sampdoria was corrected (divided by two) to take into account that Milano, Genova, Roma, Torino and Verona host two major teams. In addition, even if Chievo is a little neighbourhood of Verona, having about 4,500 residents according to the local parish, we considered the aggregate town data, but no significant differences in estimation results come from the use of alternative measures.
The third group includes variables related to match quality capturing the uncertainty of outcome and expected attractiveness. Proxies for these variables are derived from betting market, as suggested by Thomas (1988, 1992) , Kuypers (1996) 11 The strong correlation of odds among bookmakers led us to select those proposed by Bet365 because of a more inclusive coverage.
12 As in we used two different measures of game closeness: the Absolute Difference of Win Probabilities between home and away team and the Home Team Win Probability. The latter was included both in linear and non-linear (squared) term, to verify the existence of a U-shaped relationship between attendance and home team winning expectation. We also added a variable for the attractiveness of match, namely, the expected number of goals, embodied in the odds associated to the event 'more than 2.5 goals' (Over 2.5). Another variable dealing with match quality is the talent incorporated in the players. Following Fort and Quirk (1995) , Vrooman (1995) and Szymanski (2003) we used wages of players as a proxy of sport talent of each team, and computed, for each match, the ratio between the gross wages 10. Source: ISTAT, www.demo.istat.it (July, 2012). 11. See www.football-data.co.uk/italym.php (June, 2012 of home team and the aggregate gross wages of both teams. The expected sign is negative because of when the ratio decreases, in the case of top teams playing away, potential superstar effect emerges shifting up the attendance. The fourth group of variables deals with the security aspects. As mentioned above, starting from the season 2007/08 all matches are monitored by Observatory. We, then, introduced a dummy variable (Risky Matches) equals to 1 for matches identified as highly risky and 0 otherwise. We also added a dummy (Fidelity Card Exemptions) for matches under risk with restriction exemptions to fans joining the fidelity fan card program. Note that 410 of 1,310 matches were labelled as risky, and entry restrictions exemptions were allowed for 253 matches.
The last group of dependent variables includes a dummy (Working Day) denoting whether a match was scheduled within the working week, and a count variable Match Day capturing the time trend within the season. Descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the econometric investigation are listed in Table 2 . Please note that data on Game Tickets was provided by an independent source, namely, Stadiapostcards.com, which extracts information from newspapers (this is the only source available in Italy), and that the minimum value of the dependent variable (3), even hard to believe, is an actual figure. Figure 2 describes the statistically distribution of the dependent variable Game Tickets. A key issue in the football demand estimation arises when ticket demand exceeds the stadium capacity. In this case, the number of tickets sold is not an effective representation of the demand. To address this problem we fixed as 'sold-out' those matches with an attendance above the 95% of the capacity [the threshold is the same as that of ] and found that only 23 of 1,227 were 'sold-out' (1.9%). It is also worth stressing that stadium architecture remained unchanged in the period under investigation since only Juventus FC relocated into the new Juventus Stadium in the season 2011/12. Generally, the new stadium architecture influences the attendance of the home team (Feddersen and Maennig, 2009 ); nonetheless, in this case we believe that the potential 'novelty effect' (Feddersen et al., 2006) of the new stadium can be assessed only in the medium/long period, since in the Championship 2011/12 Juventus FC won the national title, so making difficult to single the novelty effect out from the sport performance. This explains why we used the conventional fixed and random effect model instead of the censored regression model. A similar approach is found in Buraimo and Simmons (2009) 
ESTIMATION RESULTS
The Random Effects-Generalized Least Squares model (REM-GLS) and the Fixed Effects Model (FEM) techniques were used in the empirical investigation. The REM-GLS estimates used the Nerlove's transformation; the FEM estimates used the Arellano standard error correction due to heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis that both REM-GLS and FEM models are consistent is rejected by the high value of the Hausman statistic. Hence, we discuss only the FEM results. To elude the problem of collinearity among the variables associated with the close- Figure 2 Frequency distribution of game tickets ness of the match, we estimated two separate models [(1) and (2)]. The first includes Home Team Win Probability (both linearly and non-linearly), the second the Absolute Difference of Win Probabilities. Table 3 shows the results.
The table reveals no substantial differences in the results obtained from models (1) and (2) except for Wages Ratio, of significance only in model (2). We also observe that all significant variables have the expected sign. First, results worthy of discussion concern the effect of the Italian counter stadium violence on payat-the-gate supporters. We observe that the coefficients on the dummies Risky Matches and Fidelity Card Exemptions are both significant and of the expected sign. The minus sign on Risky Matches implies that the entry restrictions have a negative effect on occasional spectators and the detrimental effect may be quantified in about 2,200 fans. The Fidelity Card Exemptions tests, on the other hand, whether entry restriction with exemptions to the fidelity card's owners worked. The positive sign on its coefficient supports that it worked with an estimated effect on attendance of about 1,300 units less. As a result, when exemptions to entry restrictions are allowed for card owners, the estimated net effect on attendance is of about 900 units less. Another side effect of such measures has been the reduction in the amount of seasonal tickets sold. As a matter of fact, the seasonal ticket owners decreased on average by 13% since season 2009/10. Our view is that the increase in casual fans attendance is also driven by the reduction in seasonal ticket owners induced by the opposition of organized fans to the commercial profile of the fidelity fan card. This hypothesis is confirmed by the positive sign on the coefficients of the seasonal dummies 2010/11 and 2011/12, which implies that the increase in the casual fans has a strong time component, easily recognizable with the fidelity fan card project. Turning to the set of demographic variables we note that Home Team Population does not show any significant association with the dependent variables; by contrast, the Away Team Population appears to be significantly and negatively associated with the quantity of game tickets sold. Put differently, the larger is the population of away team the lower is the demand for tickets. This is reasonable if we take into account that in larger cities the supply of other leisure and entertainment activities is relatively higher than that available in smaller cities. Then, people from big cities can substitute football matches with other leisure activities easily, so reducing the flow of big crowds of away fans.
From the set of economic variables, of notable relevance is the Tickets Price Index. As this variable is measured in logs, its coefficient gives the elasticity of casual fans demand to the relative price. The estimated elasticity is consistent with the theory on profit maximization by monopolistic firms, which predicts that prices are to be set in the elastic section of the demand. Nevertheless, our result is not in line with Borland and Macdonald (2003) , and Villar and Guerrero (2009) that found a tickets price strategy by sport teams at variance with profit maximization. The estimated elasticity value of about 1.3 also opens to the option for a price-reduction policy designed to increase pay-at-the-gate attendance along with ticket revenues. Finally, the significant and positive sign of the coefficient on Home Team Employment Rate suggests that attendance is positively related with the current trend of the economy; then football may be considered a normal good in the preference structure of Italian fan/consumer. Turning to variables associated with match quality, it emerges that Italian casual fans are attracted not so much by a more balanced competition but rather by the performance of their home teams. This interpretation follows from the sign and statistical significance of coefficient on Absolute Difference of Win Probabilities in model (2) and of Home Team Win Probability in model (1). Furthermore, the opposite sign on the coefficients associated with linear and quadratic term of Home Team Win Probability in model (1) suggests a U-shaped relationship between the home team expected victory and occasional fans attendance. Hence, the Italian approach is not dissimilar to the one emerged in other contexts, such as the English Premier League and the Spanish Liga. What differs is the extent of such inclination. While in the turning point of the quadratic relationship is at a probability of home team win of 0.35, in our estimation the turning point is at 0.46. Doubts arise, on the other hand, on the relevance of the expected attractiveness for match, proxied by the odds on expected goals, as the sign on coefficient associated to Over 2.5 is not significant.
Eventually, with regard to the variables addressing the influence of the match day, we observe that a strong negative impact on casual fans attendance of about 12% -ceteris paribus -takes shape when the match is played on working days. This implies a loss in pay-at-the-gate attendance of about 1,100 units (when matches are not scheduled on Saturday or on Monday), with a revenue loss of about €27,500 per match on average. 13 The hypothesis of an increase in interest, and hence on attendance, for matches that are scheduled later in the season is confirmed by the sign and significance of Match Day.
CONCLUSION
This study presented a short-run analysis of demand for football, proxied by payat-the-gate attendance for Italian Serie A, to investigate the impact of counterhooliganism policies introduced by Italian government with Decree n.8 of 8th February 2007. The empirical analysis used data at single match level for five seasons, from 2007/08 to 2011/12, obtaining information on 1,330 matches, and a pooled time-series dataset consisting of 289 cross section units over a time range between two and five years. Modelling game tickets as a function of a number of economic, geo-demographic and sport variables, and using pooled least square techniques, the main results of the paper are:
41/2007, must be also interpreted in the light of a reduction of seasonal tickets because of the opposition of large quotas of organized fans against the commercial profiling of the fidelity card. In sum, the measures adopted have not reversed the negative trend in stadium attendance that is one the most relevant shortcomings of the Italian professional football.
